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A RECONSTRUCTION OF
BERNARD LONERGAN'S
1947-48 COURSE ON GRACE, PART 1
Reconstruction by Robert M. Doran,
working from notes taken by
Frederick Crowe and William Stewart
Editor's Introduction: The notes we have from Bernard Lonergan on the
website www.bemardlonergan.com for his 1947-48 course on grace at
the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto (now Regis College) are in two sets. They
appear at 16000DTL040 and 16200DTL040. Translations by Michael Shields,
with extensive editorial work by H. Daniel Monsour, are also available on
the website, at 16000DTE040 and 16200DTE040. It is difficult, and in fact
probably impossible without further external guidance, to put the two sets
of notes in order and to relate them to each other. Fortunately, that guidance
is available in the form of notes taken by Frederick Crowe and William
Stewart, who were Jesuit students in the course. Their notes, preserved by
Crowe, give a very clear indication regarding the order of the course. They
enable us to reconstruct the course, something that would not be possible
even in piecemeal fashion if we were working only from the archival data.
The course is important in Lonergan' s development. It represents in
several respects an intermediate position between his 1946 systematic treatise
"De ente supematurali" 1 and his contributions to a course on grace in 195152, again at the Jesuit Seminary. 2 In the latter contribution he introduced
material that would come to be known as his "four-point hypothesis"
1

Earl N°'; available with English translation ("The Supernatural Order'') in Bernard Lonergan,
Shi~ Latin Theology, vol. 19 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G.
and ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
201~)ds
,52-255.
2

in Ea ~otes _for the latter course are available as "Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace,"
r Y latm Theology, 562-665.
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relating the four divine relations to four created terms.
What follows is the first installment on a reconstruction of the 194748 course, working from the notes of Crowe and Stewart. References to
"Boyer" are to Charles Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina (Rome: Gregorian
University Press, 1946). This text was used as something of a basis for the
course, though Lonergan relied mostly on his own notes.
This initial installment will be followed by several more articles. The
entire course is worth making available, especially since we have such
carefully written notes left us by Crowe and Stewart.
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1. Six Introductory Points3
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The word "grace" means favor or benevolence, the benevolence of
someone toward someone else, as in "to find favor with someone."
It means also a gift given out of benevolence, as well as recompense
for the gift, as in having a grateful spirit and giving thanks.
Finally, it means appearance, comeliness, beauty, even deceptive
The reality itself that we are concerned with in a course on grace
is the life of Christ communicated to us gratuitously. John 6:56-57:
"Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood abide in me, and I
in them. Just as the living Father sent me, and I live because of the
Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me." John 15:l-S:
"I am the true vine, and my Father is the vinegrower. He removes
every branch in me that bears no fruit. Every branch that bears
fruit he prunes to make it bear more fruit. You have already been
cleansed by the word that I have spoken to you. Abide in me as I
abide in you. Just as the branch cannot bear fruit by itself unless it
th
abides in the vine, neither can you unless you abide in me. I am e
vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them
bear much fruit, because apart from me you can do nothing." .
15
These texts treat the life of Christ communicated to us. It a
gratuitous gift. The gratuity of this gift appears in Ephesians 2:l-lO:
"You were dead through the trespasses and sins in which you once
th
lived, following the course of this world, following the ruler of e

I

3See 16200DTL040, 1; 16200DTE040, 1-2.
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power of the air, the spirit that is now at work among those who
are disobedient. All of us once lived among them in the passions of
our flesh, following the desires of flesh and senses, and we were by
nature children of wrath, like everyone else. But God, who is rich
in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us even when
we were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with
Christ- by grace you have been saved- and raised us up with him
and seated us with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus, so that
in the ages to come he might show the immeasurable riches of his
grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus. For by grace you have
been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the
gift of God - not the result of works, so that no one may boast. For
we are what he has made us, created in Christ Jesus for good works,
which God prepared beforehand to be our way of life." Similarly,
throughout most of the New Testament there is talk of the life of
Christ that exists in us.
This life of Christ in us is the object of this treatise.
3. What sort of thing is this life of Christ? Is it merely human life? No,
since the life of Christ is simultaneously human and divine. We are
speaking of the life of Christ, who is simultaneously man and God.
His life in us consists in the love of friendship toward God in this
life and beatific vision in the future life. Because Christ is God he has
the beatific vision so that he knows himself as God, and he has the
charity by which he loves himself as God. Thus, this life of Christ
in us is a participation in the divine nature: charity on earth, vision
in heaven. 2 Peter 1:4: "he has given us, through these things, his
precious and very great promises, so that through them you may ...
become participants of the divine nature."
4· Thus we participate in theandric life. This life is above our nature,
since it is the life of a man not as just a man but as a man who also
is God. Thus faith is above reason, charity above the natural love of
God, deeds meritorious of eternal life above the natural merits of
man, the beatific vision above the limbo of the unbaptized infants.
This is the distinction between supernatural and natural life. This
man Jesus Christ is God through the hypostatic union. And the
Christian as a member of the mystical body of Christ participates

i

28

METHOD:

Journal of Lonergan Studies

in the theandric life of Christ through sanctifying grace, from which
flow faith, charity, and merits unto beatific vision.
5.

This life is grace, a gift given out of benevolence. It is a gratuitous
gift for two reasons.
(a) It is a gratuitous gift because we are sinners: recall Ephesians
2:1-3. The life of Christ is not owed to sinners. The sinner
loses all right to eternal life. Therefore, it is a gift given out of
benevolence, not out of justice.
(b) But it would be a gratuitous gift even if we were not sinners.
We have everything required for our natural life, everything
that follows upon human nature or is needed by human
nature, which is complete in itself. Grace is something beyond
human nature, beyond the proportion of our nature, whether
constitutively- I am a man without this life - or by consequence
- I can operate as a human being without this life - or by way
of exigence - this life is not owed to a mere human being, but to
that one alone who is not only man but also God.

6.

There is thus a twofold effect of grace. It is simultaneously healing
and elevating. It is healing because it revives fallen nature by taking
away the darkness of our mind, the weakness of our will, the
tendency of the flesh to sin; it is elevating insofar as it confers the
life of Christ that is communicated to us and participated in by us.
It gives supernatural life, merits that lead to beatific vision.

2. The Various Senses of the Word "Grace"4

Since everything that God has conferred upon us is given to us gratis, it is well
to distinguish the various meanings of the word "grace." So we distinguish:
4See 16200oTL040, 2; 16200oTE040, 2-3. From the notes of Crowe and Stewart it s~ms
that Lonergan simply referred his students to page 8 in Boyer, Tractatus, where th~se vanou;
meanings are presented. Lonergan' s notes repeat in outline form most of the distinctions ~o~
in Boyer. But this material does not appear in the Crowe and Stewart notes. Stewart has sunp Y
"Cf. auct. p. 8."
,
ary
Boyer's treatment contains a few more items than are found in Lonergan 5 sunun f
statement of it. It speaks also of (1) a distinction between the grace of God and th e grr ~f
Christ, and (2) a distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace in the or er
habitual grace, and between gratia excitans and gratia adiuvans in the order of actual grace.
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uncreated: God himself
created: finite, contingent
in a broad sense: natural things
in a strict sense: in the order of vision, charity, merit, faith
given gratuitously (gratis data): for the good of the church
(prophecy, miracles, discernment)
making pleasing (gratum faciens): for the sanctification of
the individual
as healing: by acting against the effects of original and
personal sin
as elevating: by bestowing the life of Christ, participation in
the divine nature
habitual: the root of elevation, sanctifying grace
the consequences of elevation, infused virtues,
gifts of the Holy Spirit
actual: regarding proximately the acts themselves
internal: the illumination of the intellect, the inspiration
of the will
external: preaching, education, etc. 5
3. The Importance of This Treatise 6

The Importance of this Treatise
From the end of our Society:
Summary of the Constitutions, Rule 2: "The end of this Society is not
only to devote ourselves to the salvation and perfection of our own souls
with God's grace, but with the same to devote ourselves earnestly to the
salvation and perfection of others."
One who has the life of Christ is saved; and the more one possesses this
. 5Boyer indicates that there are various interpretations of the distinction between gratum
data. Gratia gratum fadens for Boyer is either habitual or actual, but his
tinction is expressed in terms of "permanent" and "transient," and he does not explicitly
Specify "actual grace" as a subcategory of "elevating" grace, which Lonergan's schematic list
:rns to do. Preaching, education, and so forth, however, do not qualify as actual grace in
nergan's definition, but fit more under the category of "gratia gratis data."

~~s ~nd _gratis

6

th At this point 16200DTL040 and 16200DTE040 contain a section that is not found in
Loe notes of Crowe and Stewart. It is addressed to Lonergan's students precisely as Jesuits.
Mi~an ~ay not have used it, since the notes have no mention of it. But we provide here
el Shields's translation of this section.
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life, the greater is one's perfection. Accordingly, it is in order that you may
know the end of your vocation as the salvation and perfection of yourselves
and that of others that this treatise on grace is being presented.
From the principal means:
As above: "with God's grace," "with the same."
Summary of the Constitutions, Rule 16: "Let all who belong to this
Society devote themselves to the pursuit of solid and perfect virtues and
spiritual things, and let them consider these to be of greater importance than
learning or other natural human gifts; for the former are those interior things
from which efficacy must flow to external things for the end proposed to us."
From the priesthood which you desire and are preparing for: A priest,
an alter Christus, who puts on Christ for his personal sanctification and offers
Christ in the name of Christ and of the Church for the living and the dead.
4. Methodological Points7

There is a twofold order of knowledge. In terms of the principle, there is
natural reason, and there is divine faith. In terms of the object, there are those
things to which natural reason can attain, and there are mysteries hidden in
God. In theology, the principle is reason illumined by faith and inquiring
earnestly, devoutly, seriously, and the object is the intelligible ordering of
the mysteries in response to 1:1nderstanding, whether from their connections
with one another or from analogy with the natural order. Thus, natural
reason is to the object of science or philosophy as God is to the mysteries.
This intelligible ordering is imperfect. Theology is a science, not purely aTicl
simply but with some qualifications.
9
What is the analogy of nature? 8 First, it is religious psychology. A
st
science that asks about life is psychology; here the issue is our life in Ch~i '
st
and so we are involved in religious psychology. The soul in general is the f~r
act of an organic body. The soul more specifically is known by proc~
7

See 16200DTL040, 4; 16200DTE040, 4-5.
8Th
next two paragraph are not refl ct d in the not s of either Stewart or Crowe.e~::
app ar, how v r, at this p int in 16200DTL040, 4, and 16200DTE040, 5. It may be th at Lonbefow
did not raise thi i ue in hi class pr ntation. But
then xt note, and the comment
at note 12.
iJ1
9The next several lines in this section sup.port the interpretation provided by. Mon:~~he
16200DTE040, 5, note 4, that this reference to "religious psychology" in connection whysical
• tl ' metap
analogy of nature refers to the use that medieval theologians made of Ansto e 5
psychology in the theology of grace.
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from objects, acts, potencies, and the diversity of potency to different kinds
of soul and different perfections of potencies. Similarly, we can proceed from
sanctifying grace, the virtues, the gifts, actual grace, the illumination of the
intellect, the inspiration of the will.
Second, there arise questions about divine providence and governance,
about the distribution of grace, about God operating in the operations of
nature, and about the relation of grace to freedom.
5. The Mode of Proceeding10
1.

As in every science, so also in theology there are two questions that
have to be dealt with concerning each individual matter, namely, "Is
it?" and 'What is it?"

2. But since theology is a science unlike others, since its principle is
not natural reason but reason illumined by faith, these questions are
answered differently in theology from the way they are in the other
sciences.

3. In a natural science and in philosophy the question "Is it?" is
answered either by appealing to the witness of the senses, to
experience, to internal consciousness, or by reference to principles
that are self-explanatory.
In theology, however, the question "Is it?" is answered by
reference to the documents of the faith.
Take, for example, the question whether we participate in the
life of Christ. We do not go to our interior religious experience for an
answer. True, one may say with St Paul, "It is no longer I who live,
but it is Christ who lives in me" [Galatians 2:20]; but someone else
may say that he never had such an interior experience.
Rather, we address this question from the documents of the
faith; that is:
(a) from the revealed word of God, written or by tradition; thus
"reason illumined by faith;"
(b) interpreted according to th mind of the church, which is
the guardian and interpr ter of the deposit of the faith, from
1

°See 16200DTL040, 5-6; 16200DTE040, 6-8.
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whose authority the church Fathers and theologians have their
authority since they appeal not to their own ideas but to those
sources that express the mind of the church;
(c) according to how this revealed word of God is understood by
the Fathers;
(d) according to the consensus among theologians.11
4.

There is a prior difficulty concerning the question "What is it?"
The question 'What is it?" is twofold. First it is answered by a
nominal definition, from experience, and subsequently by the
essential definition, from understanding.
An essential definition proceeds from an act of understanding.
"To understand" is an act that is frequently found in bright people
but rarely in the slow-witted.
Science [scientia] is first act with respect to understanding. That
is, it is the habit whereby one understands promptly, easily, and
with delight; it is that which is deficient in a learner, for a learner
understands slowly and with difficulty and considerable effort.
Do not confuse such knowledge with the object of knowledge
(the known, Science) or with the signs of knowledge, such as
demonstration, certitude, etc. These signs can be quite deceptive,
since they are demonstrations "that" and not ''because of" - thu s,
we can argue that God exists, and still not understand God and empirical certitudes derived from the senses or from faith.
One can study philosophy, biology, chemistry, physics without
understanding anything. One can know about many things but
know nothing, and repeat words, like a parrot.
5.

In theology is there science in the true sense of the w ord?
(a) There is some fruitful understanding (DB 1796 [DS 3016, ND
132]). One arrives at an intelligible ordering of the revealed
truths both from their connection with one another and froIIl
the analogy with nature.
.
This is a most fruitful ordering. It r mains throughout life.
th
Scriptural texts, th writings of the Fathers, the councilS, e

11

.

) (d)

ln 16200DTL040, Lonergan's original ordering was what here are (a), (c,
indicated by hand that the order should be changed.

nd (b). l{e
a
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statements of theologians easily slip out of one's memory; but
understanding of revealed truth remains; it is a habit, a second
nature, as it were.
(b) This understanding is not transformative but penetrative,
explicative.
It is not transformative: see DB 1800 [DS 3020, ND 136].
The reason for this is that [the natural] sciences proceed from
sensible data that are first understood in one way and then in
another way: Ptolemy, Newton, Einstein. Transformations occur
because sensible data as sensible are not things but rather are
as the material element of things. Through understanding we
come to know forms, and in this way understanding grows.
Judgment follows the act of understanding. Theology, on the
other hand, proceeds not from experiential data but from truths,
from what are already constituted by matter and form or by
form alone. The truth comes first, and then it is explained. The
act of understanding follows judgment. The coherence of truths
with one another is exhibited. The truths are defended. Thus,
in progressing and increasing, theological understanding does
not change the truth itself but penetrates more deeply into the
understanding of the truth, its intelligible ordering, and its
implications. The same dogma, in the same sense, remains. The
truths do not depend on our understanding.
(c) This penetration is not perfect and complete but imperfect and
incomplete. DB 1796 [DS 3016, ND 132].
The reason is that the principal object of theology is God.
We do not know what God is, what he is in himself, and so our
theological understanding is deficient in respect to its principal
and central concern. Our act of understanding is always with
respect to sensible data. God is not a sensible intelligibility, and
so we cannot understand God. We know the signs, we know
truths that are connected with God, we know their connections,
and so on, but we do not und rstand God. To know what God
is, of course, is to understand God a he is in himself, and that
is the beatific vision. This vision is not granted to us in this life.
The analogical understanding that _is attained, though, is very
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fruitful. There is progress in the understanding of a doctrine that
always remains the same. And this understanding is obscure,
not perfectly clear. We see intelligible connections, relations, but
we never succeed in answering the question "What is God?"
Both Crowe and Stewart add a comment that does not
appear in 16200DTL040.12 As Stewart expresses it, "Existit
analogia inter psychologiam naturalem et psychologiam
supematuralem," "There exists an analogy between natural and
supernatural psychology." Crowe writes, "Analogia ex psychol
accepta adiuvat ad bene intelligendum ... Etiam ex nat. theol.
- de concursu," "An analogy received from psychology helps
us understand ... Also from natural theology, on concursus."
6. A Comment on the Order13

Commentary on Boyer's Tractatus de Gratia Divina, Prooemium, § 1, I, 314
Theological knowledge is an intellectual habit whereby one understands in
first act and therefore can clearly, distinctly, coherently, and in an orderly
way expound truths revealed by God, considered both in themselves and in
their connection with natural truths.
[Terminology]

habit: a relatively stable quality
intellectual: existing in a human intellect
12But see above, 8, note 8. It may be that the pres nt comment reflects what is presented
there on "religious psychology."
,,
•
•
.
1 m p Boyer.
13
16200DTL040 has one page (8) headed "Commentanus m librum manua e · f
While its contents do not appear as such in the notes of Crowe or Stewart, it does repeat a e~
.
.
.
B er'smanua,
thmgs we have JUSt seen; and Lonergan does m fact move next to comments on oy
sower produce the page here, in Michael Shields's translation.
. "The
14
The r fer nee is to Boyer, Tractatus de gratia divina 5-6. Lonergan quotes Boye;- Uows
O
obj ctive conn ction of things favors St Thoma ' ord r [in th Summa]." In fact, Boyer 'tion
.
h
d of expos1
that order quite do ely. But Lon rgan adds: "On wond r whether t e or er
t king
matters much." We will s e Lonergan following Boyer's order only bri fly a nd t~en :ably
off on his own. This page of "Commentary" addresses primarily this issue and so is pro
setting up his eventual departure from Boyer's order.
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Beware of the modem way of speaking of Science with a capital S [see
above, 10]. A science is something in someone's mind; it is that act by which
we can tell the difference between bright and slow-witted people.
in first act: one who knows a science does not always understand his science in second act. He is different, however, from a learner in that he can
promptly, easily, and with delight understand in second act, whereas a learner
understands in second act slowly, with difficulty and considerable effort.
The eye is to eyesight is to seeing as the intellect is to science is to
understanding.
There is this difference, that eyesight is produced naturally, while
science is obtained from a teacher and principally from the light belonging
to the agent intellect.
Just as nature, with the help of a physician, produces health, so the light
of the intellect, with the help of a teacher, produces scientific knowledge
[Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 11, aa. 1-4].
Therefore, one can first speak an inner word and then an outer word,
and does so because one understands. I can define and order and judge
insofar as I understand; otherwise I am a parrot.
To understand and to speak: it is an illusion to believe that one
understands yet cannot speak; it is a deceptive but specious beclouding of
the mind, not science.

revealed truths, etc.: an improper expression: for science is defined not
through an immanent object (truth) but through a transcendent object
(the real).
To avoid difficulties, namely, those that appear concerning the act of
faith, which in-some way excludes and in some way admits understanding,
see DB 1795, 1796 [DS 3015, 3016; ND 131-132],
~~e sense is: the purpose of theology is to understand scripture and
~adition, i.e., to be able to embrace and view in one intelligible grasp all that
18
to be found in that twofold source.
All phenomena are to physical sciences as all of revelation is to theology.
Conclusion:
Theology, like any other science, is acquired only by protracted study.

hi hAcquiring it is.like going up a circular staircas : attaining it is like b ing
g up, and the intellectual view from there must take in everything in
ertou
. nd erstand any part correctly.
Basically, then, it matters little where one _begins.

0rd
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7. The States of Nature 15

"State" means the plan [ratio], possible or actual, of divine providence
according to which human nature considered concretely is directed to a
determined end under determined conditions. 16

ratio: conception, plan, design, blueprint [Stewart];
possible or actual: some states are merely hypothetical, others actual
and historical;
human nature considered concretely: not universal, but all particulars;
all human beings
end: that for the sake of which something is or is being done [Stewart:
that for the sake of which someone acts or something is done]
end of the operator: the apprehended good moves the appetite;
the efficient cause
end of the work: the good to which is directed what is or is being
done; the final cause
natural end: in accordance with the proportion of a nature, that
which human nature is able to attain in itself
supernatural end: beyond the proportion of nature, that which is
beyond the power of nature, what human nature in itself cannot attain; in
the concrete case, the beatific vision
absolutely supernatural: exceeding the proportion of any
nature whatsoever
relatively supernatural: exceeding the proportion of a given
substance or nature
under determined conditions: before or after original sin; with or
without the perfect submission of the sensitive to the rational; with or
without the gifts of pure nature [Stewart].
Thus we come to the division of the states of nature.
- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------14
15See 16200DTL040, 8. Lonergan has there a handwritten reference "Boyer P·
.
·" T~
section in Boyer's Tractatus de Gratia Divina devoted to the states of human nature is loca~
on 14-19. Another handwritten reference in 16200DTL040 is to "Garrigou P· 18." 5tew,ar~ ~1:
5
"P. Garrigou-Lagrange P. 18 & sqq." It is not clear which book of Garrigou-Lagrange e
referring to. (He also has "P. Lange," which does not appear in Lonergan's notes.)
.
·
· ·ts totality
16Boyer, 14, quoting Suarez, "the condition or mode of being of human nature m 1 . .
iJl
in relation to its ultimate end, according to the order of divine providence" ("coo<licio;~
seu modum se habendi totius humanae naturae in ordine ad suum ultimum finem, secun
divinae providentiae ordinem").

Doran: Lonergan's 1947-48 Course on Grace, Part 1

37

[Handwritten in Lonergan's typescript:]
We pose the question about the states of nature at this point because
grace is defined as a gift unowed to anyone. Grace: a gift conferred out of
benevolence.
grace in the broad sense: a gift absolutely unowed, but owed on the
supposition of a nature.
grace in the strict sense: a gift unowed both absolutely and on
the supposition of a nature: it does not belong to the constituents, the
consequences, or the exigencies of a nature in the present state of nature [prout
natura nunc est].
grace as elevating: leading to the vision.
grace as healing: counteracting the ills of fallen nature.

For a natural end:
[the state] of pure nature: nature with all that follow from it;
[the state] of integral nature: with the addition of spontaneous
submission of the sentient part to the rational part [Boyer: this state does not
include the supernatural "quoad substantiam"];

For a supernatural end:
[the state] of original justice (or innocence): grace, perfect submission,
other gifts; [Boyer quotes Thomas: reason is submissive to God, the lower
powers to reason, the body to the soul; he adds that all this is a result of
sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, ignorance, and error,
immunity from sadness, disease, death; by reason of sanctifying grace, this
state was supernatural "quoad substantiam"];
[the state] of fallen [and unrepaired] nature: sin and the rebellion of
sense; [Boyer: the sole end of man remains supernatural, but we are destitute
of grace, without which the end cannot be attained; the other gifts that in the
st
ate of innocence flowed from sanctifying grace are lost];
[the state] of repaired nature: grace and the rebellion of sense; [Boyer:
thro
ugh Christ's redemption there is restored with sanctifying grace some
supernatural subjection or reason to God and an ordering to our ultimate
nd
e , but there remains the rebellion of lower appetite against the higher, i.e.,
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concupiscence, even though we can resist it; this state pertains more to the
person than to nature, for it is persons that are repaired, not nature itself]. 17
8. Boyer Part 1: The Necessity of Grace 18

Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 109 & sqq. 19
Definition: Grace is a gift given out of benevolence: an unowed gift
both absolutely speaking and on the supposition of a nature. "Grace" is
understood in this way throughout this section. Thus, grace does not pertain
to or follow upon human nature (fallen) constitutively, or as a consequence,
or by way of a demand or requirement; and this is understood with respect
to human nature concretely understood, as human nature now is.
1
7These five states are simply listed in Stewart's notes, not divided into their reference to a
natural or supernatural end. Thus: "(1) the state of pure nature; (2) the state of integral nature:
that state de facto never existed; (3) the state of original justice (or innocence); (4) the state of
fallen and unrepaired nature: de facto it never existed (or perhaps for a few hours) because of
the promise of the Redeemer and the future merits of Christ; (5) the state of repaired nature."
Boyer's first assertion regarding these matters, following these notions of the states, is to
the effect that de facto, human nature has existed in only two states: the state of original justice,
and the state of fallen and repaired nature. His second assertion is to the effect that original
justice is not adequately but only inadequately distinguished from sanctifying and elevating
grace. That is, sanctifying grace is the chief element of original justice. A third assertion states
that the state of pure nature would have included, besides the essential principles of the hum~n
and the faculties requisite for us to have the physical power to attain a natural end, special
divine aids that are altogether necessary for us to have the moral power to attain our end. And
a fourth assertion states that in the state of original justice assistance against the weakness of
nature was had from the gift of integrity, which followed upon sanctifying grace; this would
have been lost in the state of fallen and unrepaired nature, and the aids that would have helped
us in the state of pure nature would also have been absent; finally in the state of fallen and
repaired nature, despite the permanence of disordered lower appetites, the pursuit _of the
ultimate supernatural end is morally possible through the lavishing of supernatural ass1st~nc;
that we call grace. Boyer adds a corollary to the effect that, had fallen man not been aide
by grace, his condition would have been worse than that of man in the state of pure nature.
These matters, while not spelled out in Lonergan's notes or in those of Crowe a~d 5tewa~~
nonetheless figured in Lonergan's remarks, as is clear from jottings particularly m Crowe
notes.
nd
18
At this point the order in 16200DTL040 no longer reflects that found in the Crowe a
Stewart notes. We are presenting the latter order here.
l)
19
Boyer's first paragraph after the title "Pars Prima: De Gratia Divina Secundum Se (~ty
.
.
.
.d t· . the necess1
quotes Thornas, q. 109, to the effect that there 1s here a tnparhte cons1 era ion.
,, h is
of grace, the essence of grace, and the division of grace. When Lonergan adds "& sqq. ~ of
indicating that both Boyer and he are following the order of the Prima Secundae's treatrnen 1·s
.
.
There
grace. Lonergan will stay with Boyer's order to a point and then go off on lus ?':"n: that
1
nothing in either set of Lonergan's notes that reflects the pr sent material, and so it is like y
the notes of Crowe and Stewart are transcribing Lonergan's commentary on Boyer.
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Authors begin to speak of habitual grace only after about 1250, and
Thomas was the first to speak of actual grace [though without using this
term].
The Stewart and Crowe notes proceed to discuss Boyer's "articulus
primus:" "Utrum homo sine gratia aliquod verum cognoscere possit,"
"whether without grace we are able to know anything true." The question
corresponds to Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 109, a. 1.
After several pages on the "Status quaestionis" Boyer proceeds to thesis
l, the response to the "article" or question. It would seem from the Crowe
and Stewart notes that Lonergan moved there immediately.

8.1 Whether Without Grace We Are Able to Know Any Truth
Thesis 1: whether without grace we are able to know any truth; q. 109,
a. l. [This is found in Boyer starting on 27]. Can we know anything without
grace in the fallen state that we could have known without grace in the state
of pure nature?
Boyer's thesis reads, in translation: "Man does not need grace or a new
illumination added to the natural illumination in order to know those things
that do not exceed the nature of the human intellect. But for the human race
taken collectively to know the necessary truths of the moral and religious
order, it is in need of some special divine assistance."
Protestants and others in the seventeenth century, including Jansenius,
denied the very ability of the intellect to know any truth of the natural
order. Why? Because they did not distinguish between the natural and the
supernatural orders. Scripture insists on the necessity of grace to know
certain truths. Protestants extend this necessity to all truths. Others proceed
on the basis of skepticism, including Kant and Descartes.
DB 1806 and 2145 are appealed to. 1806 (from Vatican I) has to do with
th
e natural knowledge of God; 2145 is the Oath against Modernism, which
repeats the doctrine of 1806.
By "man" as the word is used in this thesis is meant actual human beings,
~s Boyer says (27). By "new illumination" is meant something beyond what
1S d ij
h e vered through agent intellect, phantasm, and divine concursus. "The
uman race taken co11echvely"
.
. general. And "verum"
refers to people m
th
means e correspondence of the mind to the real.
The notes of Crowe and Stewart follow Boyer in appealing to Romans
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1.18-23: "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness
and wickedness of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For
what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it
to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal p ower and divine
nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through
the things he has made. So they are without excuse; for though they knew
God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became
futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming
to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the immortal
God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed
animals or reptiles." Paul expressly says that sinners can know God; but he
does not expressly say they can do this without grace. The Greek text would
seem to indicate that if we understand those things that have been made, we
understand God himself in these things that have been made. Paul argues
from effects to cause. Therefore, natural man can know God without special
assistance. We do this in a natural way; at least this is implied.
Romans 2:14 is also commented on (and is also mentioned by Boyer):
"When Gentiles, who do not possess the law, do instinctively [sic NRS"½ for
cpuaeL] what the law requires, these, though not having the law, are a law to
themselves." As the notes of Crowe and Stewart comment, there is a dispute
over the meaning of the word cpuaeL, and so the meaning is not entirely
certain. But for the thesis it suffices as a confirmation of the preceding text.
Boyer also cites Wisdom 13 and Acts 17:28. Boyer adds that in the texts cited
it is claimed that people deprived of the grace of Christ were able to know
God and their moral duties toward God, nor are they judged because they
did not know these things but because, knowing them, they were unwilling
to fulfill them.
Stewart's notes have nothing regarding the argument from the Fathers
(see Boyer 28). As for the argument from reason (Boyer 28-29), Stewart's
notes state it is an argument from convenientia rather than a demonstration;
that is, it shows how all things come together into one, how the truths we
know are reconciled with one another.
There is no indication in the notes of either Stewart or Crowe that
Lonergan commented any further on this first thesis. Boyer's text for this
thesis extends top. 32 and includes an argument for the second part as well.
Nothing on the second part appears in the notes of Stewart or Crowe.
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8.2 Whether Fallen Man Can without Grace Fulfill the Law
Boyer's second article (32) treats the question "Utrum homo lapsus
possit sine gratia legem implere," "Can fallen man without grace fulfill
the law?"
After an introduction that treats Pelagianism and the state of the
question, Boyer's second thesis is stated (41): "Homo lapsus sine gratia
non potest diu observare omnia mandata legis naturalis, etiam quoad
substantiam operum," "Fallen man cannot for long keep all the precepts of
the natural law without grace, even as regards the substance of the works."
Crowe and Stewart mention a theological note based on the consensus
of theologians. The thesis is at least theologice certa, if not de fide definita.
There occurs next in the notes a clarification of the state of the question:
is our doing good grounded in our good will alone, or is there required grace
for us to act morally, at least with reference to fulfilling the whole law? The
notes distinguish on "observare mandata" between "quoad substantiam"
(the material law) and "quoad modum" (observing the law in a salutary
way, a way conducive to eternal life). Lonergan indicates that "diu" means
"for some months" and adds "certainly not some years."
Boyer on p. 41 offers an argument from Romans 7. Lonergan says the
argument is problematic because of the diversity of interpretations of this
text. And so he proposes another argument:
The condition of man restored is better than that of fallen man.
But not even the just (restored) person is able to observe the whole of the
natural law quoad substantiam for a long time without grace.
Therefore, even less fallen man.
Major: Romans 7:5-6; "While we were living in the flesh, our sinful
passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit
for death. But now we are discharged from the law, dead to that which
held us captive, so that we are slaves not under the old written code but in
th
e new life of the Spirit." Ephesians 2:1-10 (see above, 1). Titus 3:3-7: "For
we ourselves were once foolish, disobedient, led astray, slaves to various
~as~ions and pleasures, passing our days in malice and envy, despicable,
Sa~g one another. But when the goodness and loving kindness of God our
avior appeared, he saved us, not because of any works of righteousness that
We had done, but according to his mercy, through the water of rebirth and
renewal by the Holy Spirit. This Spirit he poured out on us richly through
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Jesus Christ our Savior, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might
become heirs according to the hope of eternal life."
Minor: Matthew 26:41: "Stay awake and pray that you may not come
into the time of trial; the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." Thus,
the help is not owed to us, otherwise it would be demanded, not implored.
1 Peter 5:8: "Discipline yourselves, keep alert. Like a roaring lion your
adversary the devil prowls around, looking for someone to devour."
Ephesians 6:10 ff.: (1) Paul puts divine grace under the metaphor "the
whole armor of God." (2) We should assume these instruments so that
we might be able to resist. See v. 16. Therefore, the need regards this very
possibility (respicit necessitas ipsam possibilitatem).
How then can we remain free? How can this fact of the need of grace be
reconciled with human freedom? The same problem recurs in other places
in this treatise, with regard to the grace of perseverance and the problem of
avoiding venial sins.
So something should be said about the will.
A fully indifferent will exists only in an infant. In us there exist habits and
dispositions (willingness) in the will. We do almost everything we do from
these habits and dispositions. But these habits and d ispositions do not take
away our freedom. We are able to act against them. But they render action
or the reception of a certain "operable" easier, more prompt, more pleasant.
We do not act against them promptly, but with difficulty and sadness. Such
habitual orientations are necessary for us and our living. We are not able
always to reflect; we would break our heads. Habits are necessary.
With these reflections we are discussing moral impotence. Moral
impotence is distinguished into "in actu primo" (with respects to habits)
and "in actu secundo" (with respect to operations).
In actu primo, moral impotence consists in the deficiency of our habits
and dispositions. We are born with intellect and will in potency for acquiring
dispositions. We cannot act as we should without good habits. But we do not
acquire a good habit unless we do the good. Is this a vicious circle? ~owe
have virtues throug~ our acts? And there can also be a positive inclinatio~ to
evil. Then our condition is even worse. But the deficiency of our inclination
to the good is sufficient for moral impotence.
In actu secundo, moral impotence consists in the fact that we acknowledge
this impotence either clearly and distinctly or obscurely and confusedly. We
know that our efforts are futile - not in single instances, but we know we
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cannot continually act well, reflect, deliberate. Habits and dispositions are
therefore necessary. We know this. Still, an error arises here. It consists in
the fact that we suppose it is entirely useless to resist. But this is because
we think it all depends on our strength. Therefore "we will sin." Still, we
sin freely, because we can reflect, posit motives, and so on, in single acts.
In a long series, in all instances taken together, however, we cannot always
resist, because we cannot always reflect, posit motives, etc. Moral impotence
affects the series of actions. Cf. De veritate, q. 24, a. 12; Sent., I, d. 39, q. 2, a.
2,ad4.
Attention turns to the "ratio theologica" in Boyer, p. 44. This is more
accurate and analytical. The will itself is divided between the universal
good that is God and the particular good that perhaps is against God. The
will is not always ordered to God in individual cases. Romans 7:15ff. ("I do
not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the
very thing I hate." Etc.)
Lange explains differently. Moral impotence is not antecedent. It regards
only the act, not the potency. Lonergan on the contrary holds that moral
impotence is antecedent, affecting the potency itself. Scripture teaches this.
Romans 7 and "ut possitis stare" (Ephesians 6:11).
Lonergan comments on three notes on p. 45 in Boyer.
Note 1: the necessity is internal because the will itself is divided. It wills
hut it does not will well. The difficulty is in the will itself, and it is radical.
Note 2: Beraza holds that divine assistance is gratuitous not because it is
~ot owed to man but because it is given in a supernatural way. Healing grace
~s owed to· fallen man, and so it is not gratuitous insofar as it is grace but
Insofar as it is elevating. Lonergan agrees with Boyer that Beraza is wrong.
Note 3: the question of grave temptations is raised. Lonergan proposes
th
at the gravity is not on the side of the object but on the side of the subject.
~tecedent impotence has not to do with individual grave temptations but
th
Wl a series of them. Otherwise freedom would indeed be removed. So
Boyer is really in the note not treating the antecedent impotence that he
stresses in the thesis itself.
( Lonergan does not treat the objections to the thesis mentioned in Boyer
46-48), but he does treat one from Lange, for whom our impotence is the
same as that of the typesetter, who is not morally able to set all letters without
error So it 18
. . . 1
full ·
m smg e acts of sin. For true sin there are required grave matter,
advertence, full consent, full liberty. But in single cases these are present.
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And so there is sin.
Lonergan denies the parity of the cases. In either case there is a statistical
law. But in the case of the typesetter, the difficulty is from the nature of the
object, whereas in the case of sin the difficulty is on the side of the subject, in
the will in itself and divided against itself. Also, mortal sin does not enter
the picture for the typesetter. Even if he prays, he makes mistakes. Again,
it is not a question of salvation. And finally, if the parity were perfect then
the sinner could not avoid sin, prayer would do him nothing, he would be
operating by himself alone, etc.
Attention seems to turn next to an assertion on p. 50 in Boyer, in a
scholion "De necessitate gratiae habitualis." The assertion reads: "Hominem
sine gratia habituali exsistentem, hominem scilicet in statu peccati mortalis,
non posse diu abstinere a novo peccato mortali," "A person existing without
habitual grace, that is, one in the state of mortal sin, cannot long avoid
committing a new mortal sin." For Lonergan two things are asserted here
in a way that confuses them. (1) Man without habitual grace cannot for any
length of time abstain from mortal sin. This truth from the thesis remains
true in this assertion. Man has moral impotence. (2) But if man in the state of
sin neglects the means and ordinary helps known to all, he renders himself
unworthy to obtain the help of actual grace. His condition then is in some
way different from what is asserted in the thesis. So Lonergan's response
is that man cannot without habitual grace long abstain from mortal sin (1)
unless he accepts actual grace (2) for which, however, he makes himself
unworthy by neglecting the ordinary means for regaining the state of
sanctifying grace.

8.3 Whether Fallen Man Can without Grace Do Any Good Work
Attention turns next to Boyer's "articulus tertius," namely, whether
fallen man can without grace do any good work After reviewing the views
of Baius, Luther, Jansenius, the Augustinians, Ripalda, Vasquez, and the
documents of the church, Lonergan defends Boyer's thesis 3 (58): "~on
omnia opera peccatorum et infidelium sunt peccata; irnmo homo lapSus sine
gratia aliquod opus· moraliter bonum peragere valet," "Not all the acts of
sinners and unbelievers are sins; indeed, fallen man without grace is able to
do some morally good works."
th
The argument is from the common opinion of the Fathers and e
tend ency of the church to support this view. Lonergan draws a ttention to
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the distinction on p. 64 in Boyer between a salutary act and a meritorious
act. And he interprets Augustine's calling "sin" even a good act that does
not lead to salvation.

8.4 Whether We Can Love God above All Things without Grace, from Our
Natural Capacities Alone
Next Lonergan turns to Boyer's "articulus quartus" and thesis 4. It
corresponds to Summa theologiae, q. 109, a. 3. Boyer's article (66): "Utrum
homo possit diligere Deum super omnia ex solis naturalibus sine gratia,"
and the thesis (68): "Homo lapsus non potest diligere Deum super omnia
actu sine gratia elicito," "Fallen man cannot love God above all things in act
without elicited grace."
Lonergan adds another argument to those offered by Boyer. One who
cannot long observe all the commandments cannot order all the inclinations
and dispositions of his or her will, and one who cannot order all the
inclinations and dispositions of one's will cannot love God above all things.
To the extent there remains an inclination to evil, in that respect one does
not have an ordered will. And if one does not have an ordered will, one
cannot love God above all things. For love's tendency is to a habitual stable
and permanent condition, which is not reconciled with inclinations in other
directions.
This ends the treatment of what is contained in Boyer's chapter 1 (De
necessitate gratiae sanantis, on the necessity of healing grace), pars prima
(De gratia divina secundum se), quaestio prima (De necessitate gratiae),
sectio prim.a (De necessitate gratiae ad reparationem hominis lapsi).

8.5 Whether Man Can Merit Eternal Life without Elevating Grace
Boyer's chapter 2 (under the same part, question, and section) has to
do with the necessity of elevating grace. And article 5 (73) asks "Utrum
ho~o possit mereri vitam aetemam sine gratia elevante," whether man can
~ent eternal life without elevating grace. Boyer's fifth thesis (75) reads,
"1ctus meritorii vitae aeternae elici non possunt sine gratia elevante,"
cts meriting eternal life cannot be elicited without elevating grace." This
corresponds to Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 109, a. 5. 20
tnore~ere ~here is something in Lonergan's own notes (16200DTL040, 9) that indicates he did
s
an unply comment on Boyer. But not everything contained in the notes of Stewart and
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The notes of Crowe and Stewart distinguish an act that is "mere
salutaris" (before justification) from one that is "salutaris et meritorius"
(after justification and leading to eternal life). A meritorious act is one by
which a person acquires a strict right to reward (meritum de condigno).
Grace as healing does not exceed the proportion of pure nature, just of fallen
nature, but grace as elevating exceeds the proportion of any nature, whether
pure, innocent, or fallen.
After giving Denzinger references (812, 105, 180, 1516) the notes of Crowe
and Stewart proceed to the argument, in two parts: the necessity of grace,
and the necessity of grace precisely as elevating (see also 16200DTL040, 9).
There are two presuppositions. First, eternal life is a reward for our good
works. Second, what is given as a reward for meritorious works cannot
directly and immediately be grace. Romans 11 :6: "But if it is by grace, it is
no longer on the basis of works, otherwise grace would no longer be grace."
Still it can be grace if the works themselves are from grace. 21
The basic argument for part 1 (the necessity of grace for eternal life) is:
If eternal life is grace, either this life is given apart from our merits, or if it
is given because of our merits, our good works, the works themselves are
"ex gratia," from grace. But eternal life is grace, and it is not given apart
from our works. Therefore, the meritorious works themselves come from
grace. Scripture passages are mentioned: that eternal life is grace, Romans
6:23 (especially in the context that begins with Romans 5:12 and ends at the
end of Romans 6): "For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is
eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord." John 15: lff. is also mentioned.
Lonergan adds that the necessity is physical, absolute, and antecedent.
Reference is made in his own notes to John 15:5 and DB 812. The necessity
· antecedent: we are unable; absolute: we are absolutely unable; physica
· I·· it
1s
respects individual acts, not a series of acts.
As for the second part of the argument, that the necessary grace is
precisely elevating, Lonergan's own notes speak "de supernaturalitate
gratiae qua ponimus opera meritoria," about the supernatural character of
Crowe can be found on the relevant page in Lonergan' s notes.
.
21
k although it
16200DTL040, 9, expands: "What is given as a rew ard for our good wor S, . . an
is directly comparable to those works, is not grace ...; nevertheless absolutely speaking of
be grace, that is, if those works are done out of grace. For the cause of a cause is a cau\ hat
that which is caused. And whatever causes something to have a certain quality possesse~eeds
quality itself and to a greater degree. Eternal life is the r ward for deeds done; but th ese
are meritorious because of grace; hence absolutely speaking eternal life is grace."

it;
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the grace by which we posit meritorious works. Appeal is made again to
scripture: Romans 5:5 regarding the gift of the Holy Spirit, 8:9-11, 8:15-17, 9
passim and esp. 9:16, "not on human will or exertion but on God who shows
mercy," 2 Corinthians 5:15-17, "a new creation," 2 Peter 1:4, partakers of the
divine nature.
And an argument is offered: What nature lacks physically, absolutely,
and antecedently is beyond nature. But nature lacks physically, absolutely,
and antecedently with respect to meritorious works. And so, meritorious
works or elevating grace are beyond human nature.

8.6 Whether Acts That Are Elicited with Elevating Grace Are Entitatively or
Essentially Supernatural22
Attention turns next to Boyer's sixth article (Utrum actus cum gratia
elevante eliciti sint supern&turales entitative seu essentialiter) and sixth
thesis (Actus cum gratia elevante eliciti sunt supernaturales essentialiter
seu entitative, ita ut differant quoad speciem ab actibus naturalius eiusdem
generis; yes, they are, in such a manner that they differ specifically from
natural acts of the same genus.)
A good deal of attention is given to complications arising from
terminological diversity. The supernatural is that which exceeds the
proportion of a nature. Negatively put, it is that which does not pertain
to a nature constitutively or by way of consequence of by way of required
conditions.
The supernatural is divided, first, into uncreated and created. The
uncreated supernatural is God, as God is given to us as a gift. Lonergan
~akes reference to Romans 5:5. God transcends the order of any other nature
m that there is not given in God the real distinction of essence and existence.
The created or contingent supernatural can be either absolutely or
relatively supernatural. The absolutely supernatural 1s
. what exceeds the
~roportion of any created nature, including any that God could create. It
1s neces ril ·
sa Y m the accidental order. The relatively supernatural is what
exceeds th
.
.
.
.
.
e proportion of a given nature. Life exceeds the proportion of
Illlnerals, etc.
not::e; again there is material in 16200DTL040, at 10. Again, not everything contained in the
What can
e and _Stewart is found in Lonergan' s notes. At some points he is simply repeating
e ound m Boyer.

;:wf
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Gratia sanans simply insofar as it is healing is relatively supernatural.
Gratia elevans simply insofar as it exceeds the proportion of integral nature is
also relatively supernatural.
But there is another division pertinent to either the absolutely or the
relatively supernatural, namely, extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic
supernatural is placed in the supernatural order due to some external
characteristic - e.g., while completely natural in itself, it is an instrument
of grace - while the intrinsic supernatural is due to the internal quality or
property of what is deemed supernatural. The latter can be either "quoad
modum" or "quoad substantiam." It is supernatural "quoad modum"
due to intensity or length of time or ease or delight, etc., and "quoad
substantiam" because of its essential character. In Aquinas (2-2, q. 171,
a. 2, ad 3) supernaturale quoad substantiam = supernaturale increatum;
supernaturale quoad modum = supernaturale creatum. Positivists will speak of
the supernatural quoad substantiam as possessing some ontological perfection
that is in itself unknowable. But, says Lonergan, according to Crowe and
Stewart, if nothing is asserted, it is because nothing is understood. Pay no
attention to this position. Boyer does not intend to enter this controversy.
His thesis means simply that acts elicited by elevating grace are intrinsically
and quoad substantiam supernatural. Lonergan omits discussion of genus
and species here, finding it fruitless, and simply says that acts elicited with
elevating grace are entitatively supernatural. "Entitatively" denies "extrinsic
supernatural" and "quoad mod um" and regards what pertains to the act by
reason of its own being. What is meant is the relatively supernatural, even
vis-a-vis integral human nature.
Three arguments are given:
1.

From the proportion between cause and effect: unless these acts
were intrinsically supernatural, elevating grace would not be
antecedently and absolutely required (for meritorious acts) with
physical necessity. But it is. Therefore.

2.

Again from the proportion between cause and effect: if meritorious
acts are proportioned to eternal life, which consists in the
supernatural beatific vision, they are entitatively supernatural.
Atqui. Ergo. Maier: The beatific vision is entitatively supernatura~
Any act proportion d to what is entitatively supernatural is itse
· · 1y supernatural. This argument is more stnnge
·
nt than the
enhtahve
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first, and goes beyond what is relatively supernatural to what is
absolutely supernatural.
3. An act is of the same proportion as the potency in which it is
received. But the infused habits stand to meritorious acts as potency
to act, and these habits are entitatively supernatural. Therefore, the
acts elicited in them are entitatively supernatural. (The major is true
in the case of first and second act, not in the case of prime matter
and a spiritual soul.)
Most of this can be found in Lonergan's own notes in 16200DTL040, p. 10.
What follows is Michael Shield's translation of that material. Acts elicited
with elevating grace are entitatively supernatural.
supernatural: exceeding the proportion of human nature, even integral
nature.

entitatively: not only extrinsically, from circumstances or from the end
alone; nor only in its manner; but by reason of its ontological perfection.
elevating grace: exceeding the proportion of human nature, even integral
nature. That habitual grace is intrinsically supernatural is theologically
certain. 23
This opinion is at least the common opinion, perhaps theologically
certain.
Proof: (a) From the proportion between cause and effect - relatively
supernatural. If the acts were not entitatively supernatural, elevating grace
would not be physically, absolutely, and antecedently necessary; but it is;
therefore : ..
(b) From the same - absolutely supernatural. Meritorious acts are

proportionate to eternal life, which consists in the supernatural beatific
vision; therefore . . .
There is proportion, so that there may be true justice.
. (c) Being is divided into act and potency; that is, potency is posited
: t~e same species as that of the corresponding act, and vice versa; [e.g.]
. yesight and seeing. But infused habits are to meritorious acts as potency
lS to act; therefore since infused habits are entitatively supernatural, so also
are the acts.
"Gra~ Biyer, :ractatus de gratia, Thesis XIII, part 1 (152-61). The first part of the thesis reads,
ipsa ph ~ itualis non est merus favor extrinsecus Dei, sed est donum animae inhaerens et in
Ysice permanens."·
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[They are so] relatively or absolutely, according to the teaching about
habits. But to say, "The supernatural and natural differ by reason of their
entitative perfection" is to say nothing and not know that one is saying
nothing. It is pure verbalism.
And they are specified by their formal object.

8.7 Whether Supernatural Acts Are Specified by Their Formal Objects
As for article 7 and thesis 7 in Boyer, Stewart has no treatment and
Crowe only a few lines. The article (84) is "Utrum actus supernaturalis
specificetur ab obiecto formali," whether a supernatural act is specified by
its formal object, and the thesis (85) is "Actus supernaturales specificantur
necessario ab obiecto formali," supernatural acts are necessarily specified by
their formal object.
Crowe' s comments: The analogy of nature provides a most fruitful
understanding of the mysteries (DB 1796). But in the realm of nature,
essence is known from potencies, potencies from acts, and acts from objects.
Therefore, so too in the supernatural order.
But Lonergan in 16200DTL040, p. 10, has more: They are specified by
their formal object. That is, this entitative supernatural perfection is not
unknowable but corresponds to the perfection of the formal object that is
knowable per se. Just as a sentient act and an intellectual act and a volitional
act correspond to their formal object, so also does a supernatural act. Suarez
is quite right on this point. Aristotle, Aquinas: essence is known through
potencies, potencies through acts, acts through objects.
Proof:
1. To say that they differ because of entitative p erfection is to utter
empty words.

2.

According to Vatican I the analogy of the natural contributes to a
fruitful understanding of the mysteries.

If there is an analogy of nature, then an act is specified by its formal
object, and this is a fruitful understanding.
If an act is not specified by its object, it is unknowable to us; there is no
. even
ana1ogy of nature, and absolutely every avenue to any understand mg,
minimal, is blocked.
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8.8 Whether We Can Prepare Ourselves for Grace without the Exterior
Help of Grace
Article 8 in Boyer reads "Utrum homo possit se ipsum ad gratiam
praeparare absque exteriore auxilio gratiae," and thesis 8 reads "Ad ipsam
gratiam recipiendam homo non potest per actus sine gratia elicitos positive
praeparari, ac proinde ad ipsum initium fidei absolute necessaria est gratia,"
'We are incapable of being prepared for the reception of grace through acts
elicited without grace, and so grace is absolutely necessary for the very
beginning of faith."
This corresponds to Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 109, a. 6. According to
Crowe's notes, Lonergan may have indicated that a better expression of the
thesis might be, "Ad omnem acturn salutarem etiam ad initium fidei gratia
interna est absolute necessaria," "For every salutary act and even for the
beginning of faith, internal grace is absolutely necessary."
Here, of course, we get right to the heart of Thomas' s advance on actual
grace as operative. The grace referred to is received in the intellect and the
will. It is an illumination and inspiration from the Holy Spirit. Lonergan
emphasized that it is not enough to say that it is in the intellect; the will
must be included. Relevant here is Lonergan' s thesis on actual grace in "De
ente supematurali," though there is no indication in the notes that Lonergan
referred to it.
Arguments are offered from scripture, Denzinger, and the Fathers. The
arguments scripture make reference to:
John 15:5: " ... apart from me you can do nothing;"
John 6:54-59: "Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood have eternal
life, and I will raise them up on the last day; for my flesh is true food and
~y blood is true drink. Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood abide
m me, and I in them. Just as the living Father sent me, and I live because of
the Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me. This is the bread that
c~me down from heaven, not like that which your ancestors ate, and they
died. But the one who eats this bread will live forever;"
_Ephesians 2:1-5: "You were dead through the trespasses and sins in
Which you once lived, following the course of this world, following the ruler
~~ the power of the air, the spirit that is now at work among those who are
ISobedient. All of us once lived among them in the passions of our flesh,
followm h
.
gt e desires of flesh and senses, and we were by nature children of
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wrath, like everyone else. But God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love
with which he loved us even when we were dead through our trespasses,
made us alive together with Christ- by grace you have been saved . .. "
The necessity in question is absolute, antecedent, and universal. It is a
question of a positive internal "influx," or what Lonergan calls a motio. It
regards the very beginning of faith.
Stewart's notes emphasize more than Crowe's that Lonergan pointed to
the problem of Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism here. And the necessity
is with regard to any act that leads to eternal life, and so is broader than the
meritorious act of someone who is already in the state of sanctifying grace.
There do not seem to be any treatments of this precise question in the
two sets of Lonergan' s notes pertinent to this course.

8.9 Whether the Grace Needed for One to Prepare Oneself for Grace is
Elevating Grace
Article 9 in Boyer reads "Utrum gratia necessaria ad hoc ut quis ad
gratiam se praeparet, sit gratia elevans." And thesis 9 reads "Actus omnes
qui positive praeparant ad gratiam recipiendam eliciuntur cum gratia
elevante et sunt entitative supernaturales," "all the acts that positively
prepare for the reception of grace are elicited with elevating grace and are
entitatively supernatural." Crowe emphasizes that the mind of Thomas on
this is uncertain, and probably will never be determined. Lonergan stresses
the same thing in Grace and Freedom, though he tips his hand obliquely in the
direction defended in this thesis. Obviously in teaching the course Lonergan
did not take exception with Boyer's thesis. Crowe and Stewart provide the
same argument from Lonergan: "Ad actus salutares etiarn ad initium fidei
requiritur gratia interna, absoluta, antecedens, physica, necessaria. Atqui
haec necessitas abs. phys. intelligi non posset nisi ipsi actus salutares essen~
entitative supernaturales. Ergo sunt entitative superna turales. Min: ex thesi
ant. Maj: Quomodo res aliter explicari potest." "For salutary acts having
to do even with the beginning of faith there is required an internal grace,
with an absolute, antecedent, physical necessity. But this necessity cannot
be understood unless these salutary acts are entitatively supernatural.
Therefore ... "Stewart adds that Boyer's corollary assertion "Homo nullo
modo potest a peccato resurgere sine auxilio gratiae," "man is in no way
able to rise from sin without the help of grace," is de fide definita.
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Again, there does not seem to be any explicit treatment of this question
in the two sets of Lonergan' s notes relevant to this course.
9. Transition
Lonergan did not treat at this point the materials in the next section of the part
on the necessity of grace, Boyer's articles and theses 10-12 (corresponding
to Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 109, aa. 8-10). Rather, he moved immediately to
a second question, De essentia gratiae, the essence of grace. Stewart's notes
indicate why he made this move. Before treating the need of grace in homine
lapso sed reparato et iusto, it is best to inquire into justification itself. What is a
justified person? What is grace?
While Boyer's article 1 in this question (and his thesis 13) have some
correspondence to 1-2, q. 110, a. 1, utrum gratia ponit aliquid in anima, whether
grace posits something in the soul, nonetheless the context for the question has
to do with the Reformation. Article 1 in Boyer reads "Utrum gratia habitualis
sit aliquid animae inhaerens," whether habitual grace is something inhering
in the soul (147), and his thesis 13 reads "Gratia habitualis non est merus
favor extrinsecus Dei, sed est donum animae inhaerens et in ipsa physice
permanens," "habitual grace is not the mere extrinsic favor of God but is
rather a gift inhering in the soul and remaining there physically." For the
Reformers the grace of God was the favor of God. Hence it resided in God,
not in us. The Reformers also distinguished dogmatic faith from fiducial
faith. Fiducial faith is affective, not intellectual. The influence of nominalism
is emphasized by Lonergan here. Thesis 13 in its first part (Gratia non est
merus extrinsecus favor Dei, sed ponit aliquid animae inhaerens) is de fide
definita. In its second part (Gratia est donum physice permanens praeter
actus singulos) it is at least theologice certa. The argument for the first part is
t~en from scripture, which talks about a new life. If we find the properties of
this new life we must acknowledge the principle of the new life, a principle
proportionate to the properties.
Boyer moves to article 2, but at this point Lonergan takes off on his own.
~oyer's article 2 reads "Utrum Deus per gratiam habitualem in iustis
inha~itet," whether God dwells in the just through habitual grace. Beginning
aht t~s point Lonergan presents his own "propositions." The material
· only occasional references to Boyer's text. The second
. ere 1s all his, with
st
; alhnent on this attempt to reconstruct Lonergan' s course will move
irectly to 16000DTL040 for Lonergan' s material.

